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Seres v. Lerner, 120 Nev. Adv. Op. 95, 102 P.3d 91 (Dec. 2004)1
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—FIRST AMENDMENT
Summary
The sister of a manslaughter victim, on her mother’s behalf, brought an action against the felon,
who wrote a book regarding the killing of the victim, seeking to recover the felon’s book
proceeds under the Nevada “Son of Sam” law. The district court found the applicable Nevada
statute to be unconstitutional and dismissed the plaintiff’s action. Plaintiff appealed.
Disposition/Outcome2
The Nevada Supreme Court held that NRS 217.007, Nevada’s “Son of Sam” law (1) constituted
State action for purposes of the First Amendment; (2) was a content-based restriction on speech;
and (3) was unconstitutionally over inclusive under the First Amendment. The court held that
NRS 217.007 thus violated the First Amendment of the United State’s Constitution, and affirmed
the lower court’s decision.
Factual and Procedural History
In 1998, defendant was convicted of manslaughter for the death of Mark Slavin. While in
prison, defendant wrote a book entitled, “You Got Nothing Coming, Notes from a Prison Fish,”
which was published in 1999. The book detailed defendant’s imprisonment and contained
descriptions of the events surrounding the killing of Mr. Slavin.
Plaintiff, Mr. Slavin’s sister, sued defendant on behalf of her mother after expiration of
the statute of limitations for bringing a wrongful death action. Plaintiff sought recovery of
defendant’s book proceeds, imposition of a constructive trust, and an accounting.
The district court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s NRS 217.007 action
under Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Board,3 and plaintiff
timely appealed.
Discussion
Standard of review
First Amendment jurisprudence dictates that legislatively created content-based
restrictions on speech satisfy strict scrutiny review under which any such measure must address a
compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.4 Overinclusive
content-based measures fail this level of scrutiny.
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Historical perspectives
New York enacted the first Son of Sam law in 1977, in response to the possibility that
David Berkowitz, a serial killer known as the Son of Sam, might sell the publication rights to his
memoirs. The law was intended to ensure that money received by criminals in connection with
published storytelling about their criminal activities be made available to compensate victims.5
Following New York’s lead, the federal government and a majority of states have enacted
similar Son of Sam statutes.
In Simon & Schuster, the United States Supreme Court voided New York’s Son of Sam
law as inconsistent with the First Amendment. The Court determined the measure was contentbased, because “[i]t single[d] out income derived from expressive activity for a burden the State
place[d] on no other income, and it [was] directed only at works with a specified content.”6 The
Court found the statute to be significantly overinclusive, because it applied to the entire proceeds
from works regardless of subject, as long as they expressed the author’s thoughts or recollections
about his crime, regardless of how little of the works were mentioned, and regardless of the
purpose of the work itself.7 Additionally, the Court found the statute to be overinclusive because
it could affect works by persons never prosecuted or convicted, if the author included an
admission in the published work.8
Nevada’s Son of Sam statute
The Nevada Legislature first enacted a Son of Sam law in 1981, which it modified in
1993 to comply with the Simon & Schuster decision.9 The revision was designed to “extend []
the statute of limitations for a victim of a felony with respect to money or property gained by the
offender as a result of notoriety.”10 The revisions also eliminated the previous state-administered
fund feature of the old legislation, similar to that which proved problematic in Simon & Schuster.
The district court’s ruling
The district court found a First Amendment violation despite its determination that NRS
217.007, a content-based restriction on speech, addressed compelling state interests in
reimbursing crime victims and prohibiting profiteering from criminal activity. Following the
strict scrutiny approach taken in Simon & Schuster, the court observed that the statute was
overinclusive because it would allow recovery of proceeds from a book that is ninety percent
about religious matters and ten percent about the felony. The court concluded that the statute,
while achieving the compelling state interest of preventing a felon from profiting by commission
of a felony, did so by chilling the incentive to create expressive works with little or no
relationship to the exploitation of criminal misdeed. Thus, the court found that NRS 217.007 did
not survive the strict scrutiny analysis.
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State action
The Nevada Supreme Court has recognized that the First Amendment only applies to the
abridgment of the right of free speech by the federal or state government, and that to apply to the
states, the infringement must involve state action.11 The court then concluded that judicial
enforcement of state legislation involves state action restricting speech implicating the First
Amendment. NRS 217.007 legislatively created a cause of action that contemplates enforcement
under the state’s levy and execution statutes. Thus, while NRS 217.007 eliminated state
confiscation and administration of funds that marked Nevada’s first Son of Sam legislation, the
measure still implicated state action for First Amendment purposes.12
Content-based restriction
As stated in Simon & Schuster, “[a] statue is presumptively inconsistent with the First
Amendment if it imposes a financial burden on speakers because of the content of their
speech.”13 If the proposed expression’s contents must be reviewed in order to determine whether
the statute applies, then the statute is a content-based restriction on speech.14 The Simon &
Schuster Court concluded the New York Son of Sam law was content-based because it “single[d]
out income derived from expressive activity for a burden the State place[d] on no other income,
and it [was] directed only at works with a specified content.”15
In line with Simon & Schuster, the Nevada court concluded that, to the extent NRS
217.007 allows the filing of claims after the expiration of statutes of limitation for wrongful
death and other tort claims, it is a content-based statute. This is so because the Nevada statute
explicitly and exclusively applies to income received from speech concerning the crime
committed, and it places a direct financial burden only on speech with a specified and particular
content (reference to the felony itself). Because NRS 217.007 is a content-based restriction on
speech, it must pass a strict scrutiny level of review.
Strict scrutiny/overinclusiveness
The court agreed that Nevada has compelling interests in the compensation of crime
victims and in the prevention of direct profiteering from criminal misconduct. As a
consequence, the court next considered whether the statute was tailored narrowly to meet these
compelling interests.
Two aspects of NRS 217.007 give rise to a strict scrutiny analysis under Simon &
Schuster: first, that the victim’s ability to recover the proceeds from “any contribution to any
material that is based upon or substantially related to the felony,”16 and second, that potential
defendants in NRS 217.007 actions need not have been convicted for the crime against the
victim.
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First, NRS 217.007 provides for recovery of proceeds from “any contribution to any
material that is based upon or substantially related to the felony,” giving rise to the potential
application to works only partially or tangentially related to the crime committed. So although
NRS 217.007 does not restrict a felon from engaging in whatever speech or expression he
desires, it penalizes that speech based upon its discrete content by seizing all proceeds, regardless
of the extent to which the work relates to the crime against the victim. The court determined that
the breadth of this coverage violated Simon & Schuster.
Second, the provision does not restrict the realm of possible defendants to convicted
felons. The statute contains no conviction qualifier, subjecting any person who admits to having
committed a crime to having the entire proceeds of his work seized and made available to all the
author’s creditors.
The court held that the statute is overinclusive.
NRS 217.007 and the tort statute of limitations
The attorney general argued that NRS 217.007 simply extends the statute of limitations
otherwise applicable to tort claims with a limitation on damages, and thus creates no new or
separate cause of action. The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed, stating that to the extent a
victim may bring a traditional cause of action for personal injury, property loss or wrongful death
within the applicable statute of limitations for such matters, Nevada levy and execution laws
concerning the felon’s misconduct provide for execution against proceeds from publications,
along with any other nonexempt assets. Accordingly, to the extent that a claimant would file suit
under NRS 217.007 before expiration of the statutes of limitations cited within it, subject to the
single exception noted previously, the provision is a nullity for First Amendment purposes.
However, to the extent that NRS 217.007 operates after expiration of a particular
limitation period, it creates a separate cause of action that limits victims to recovery of a felon’s
publication proceeds. First, the statutory cause of action arises upon the felon’s entitlement to
proceeds from published material, not the actual harm inflicted upon the victim. Second, awards
under this statute would not be restricted in any way by the law of damages governing traditional
causes of action in tort. Entitlement to proceeds stimulates the viability of the new cause of
action; thus, NRS 217.007 does not renew or revive a wrongful death claim otherwise barred by
the statutes of limitation recited within it. The court concluded that this new cause of action
expands upon traditional content-based remedies that exist separate and apart from NRS
217.007.
Conclusion
The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that NRS 217.007 is a content-based restriction on
speech, the validity of which is subject to Simon & Schuster’s strict scrutiny analysis. Although
the measure addresses compelling state interests in compensating victims and prevention of
criminal profiteering, it suffers from overinclusiveness because it regulates more speech than is
necessary to serve the state’s interest. Clearly, NRS 217.007 allows recovery of proceeds from
works that include expression both related and unrelated to the crime, imposing a disincentive to
engage in public discourse and nonexploitative discussion of it. The court therefore held that
NRS 217.007 violates the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.

4

